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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-
RESIDENTS: SOME STATUTORY
DEVELOPMENTS
The essence of this note is to examine the cases involving state statutes
which authorize jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and foreign
corporations and give to a state court the power to enter a binding
judgment against one not served with process within the state. The
Virginia "Long Arm Statute" I which to date has not been tested by the
courts provides a basis for this note. Some sections of this "Statute"
will be examined in the light of case holdings and similar statutes from
other jurisdictions.
Historically, suits brought by residents of one state against foreign
corporations doing business in that state have seen an increasingly liberal
trend develop extending the in personam jurisdiction of the state over
the foreign corporation. At common law the only way to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a non-resident individual, in the absence
of express consent or general appearance, was to gain personal service
on him while he was in the forum state.2 It was not possible to obtain
in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose activities
within the forum state had given rise to a cause of action, regardless of
how notice was served.' The logic offered for this conclusion was that
a corporation was only a creature of legal existence, a resident only of
the state in which it was created, and for these reasons could not be
present within a foreign state.
To combat this corporate activity within foreign states, some states
began passing statutes authorizing foreign attachment of corporations. 4
To this end, states have enacted statutes which require a foreign corpora-
tion, before certification, to furnish the name of its registered agent to
the secretary or commissioner and which allow for substitute service
of process on the corporation through a public official in the event of
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1-8-81.5 (1964. Supp.).
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Service on the individual outside the juris-
diction of the court was not sufficient to render an enforceable judgment, notwithstand-
ing the adequacy of the notice of the hearing.
3. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839).
4. R.I. Rev. Laws 162 (1882); N.Y. Rev. Stat., tit. IV, art 1 § 15-30 (1829); Md. Laws
ch. 280 (1832). Pa. Laws 586 (1835-36); N.J. Acts 63 (1838-39); Mass. Acts ch. 158
(1839); Mo. Rev. Stat., art. 1, §§ 22,124 (1845); Mich. Rev. Star. ch. 116, § 9 ff(1846);
Me. Rev. Star., ch. 76, § 5 (1847); Wis. Rev. Star., ch. 113 § 8ff (1849).
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non-compliance before conducting activities.5 More recently, some
states have enacted statutes which specifically enumerate the activities
within the state by non-residents, individuals and corporations, which
will give rise to in personam jurisdiction.6 The import of these latter
mentioned statutes is clearly directed toward the control of non-resident -
commercial organizations or enterprises which, for the sake of conve-
nience, are referred to as foreign corporations, and which conduct activ-
ities within the state without first complying with the registration re-
quirements7 The philosophy underlying these statutes is the protection
5. For example, VA. CODE ANN. S 13.1-102 (1956), requires the furnishing of the name
of the registered agent and the obtaining of a certificate of authority before engaging
in activity. CODE § 13.1-111 (1956) and Code § 8-60 (1950) allow for substitute service.
6. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1-8-813 (1964 Supp.). § 8-81.1 defines "person! as used
in the Chapter as follows:
.. . an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative,
or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity,
whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this State and whether or not organized
under the laws of this State.
1 8-81-2 provides when personal jurisdiction over person may be exercised:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(3) Causing tortious injury by any act or omission in this State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside this State
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered, in this State;
(5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty. expressly
or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he might
reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods in this State, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State;
(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; or
(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
§ 8-81.3 provides that service of process or notice may be made in the same manner as
provided for elsewhere in the Code. It provides further that if the non-resident has no
agent in the state then process or notice may be served on the secretary or commis-
sioner, who is deemed the statutory agent in such cases, and how such process or
notice may be made. § 8-81.4 provides for venue of the action in accordance with §
8-38, VA. CoDE ANN.
7. For example, although VA. CoD ANN. § 8-812 (a) (1) through (7) apply equally
to individual non-residents as well as foreign corporations, five of the seven activities
listed are exclusively commercial.
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of the rights of resident consumers to have their day in court when to-
day they must be touched by some phase of interstate commerce.,
In 1964 the General Assembly of Virginia enacted Chapter 4.1,
"Personal Jurisdiction in Certain Actions," to Title 8 of the Virginia
Code which contains five statutes relating to this controversial juris-
dictional problem." Section 8-81.1 of Chapter 4.1 includes in the defi-
nition of "person" both individuals and foreign corporations. Section
8-81.2 (a), the skeleton for this note, lists the activities within the state
which will give rise to personal jurisdiction over the "person." 10 From
a reading of Section 8-81.2(a) it is obvious that the statute is intended
to establish control over foreign corporations. 1
As early as 1918 such broad statutes and the increasingly more lib-
eral trend in the holdings of cases dealing with this problem were at-
tributed to social change. 1 The U.S. Supreme Court in McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance Co.13 echoed this theory when, in discussing the
trend of extending state jurisdiction, it said:
In part this [trend] is attributable to the fundamental transformation
of our national economy over the years. Today, many commercial
transactions touch two or more states and may involve parties separated
by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce
has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail
across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and commu-
nication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a state where he engages in economic activity. 14
8. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E. 761
(1961).
9. VA. CODE ANN., supra note 6.
10. Id. Five of the seven paragraphs of § 8-81.2 (a) provide the outline for this portion
of the note. The cases which pertain to the particular activity mentioned in the para-
graph will be examined in the order of activity that the section presents them. The
subject matter of paragraph (2) of 8-81.2 (a) will be included in the discussion of para-
graph 8-81.2 (a) (1) -Doing Business, eliminating the need to discuss paragraph (2). Like-
wise, paragraph (a) (4) will not be discussed as its subject matter will be encompassed
in the discussion of paragraphs (a) (3)-Tortious Act and (a) (5)-Breach of Warranty.
11. Supra note 7.
12. HENDERSON, THE PosMON OF FOREIGN CoRPoRATIONS IN AMExacAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, Chap. V (1918). This chapter traces the development of jurisdictional statutes
over foreign corporations in the Eighteenth Century as they became an important
factor in the business communities of the several states.
13. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). This case will be discussed in detail under para. (a) (7)-
Contracting to Insure.
14. Id. at 222.
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SFcTIoN 8-81.2 (a) (1)-DoING BUSINESS
Activity has been the basis for all the statutes affecting foreign cor-
porations and activity has provided the logic behind their enforcement."0
The early decisions extending personal jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations likewise were founded on the extent of the activities engaged
in by the corporation within the forum state.'0 It was said that the
corporation must be "doing business" in the state before personal juris-
diction would lie.17 Most courts at first refused to offer definitions as
to what activities would constitute "doing business." Instead, some re-
ferred to the extent of the activities as being "regular and continuous
within the jurisdiction":' or "with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity." 19 Others held that by conducting such activities the cor-
poration "consented to the jurisdiction of the state court" 2 0 or by its
activities the corporation was "present within the foreign jurisdiction"; 21
these are called the "consent" and "presence" theories. However, they
all seemed to agree that a single or isolated transaction was not sufficient
to constitute doing business,22 nor were occasional transactions over an
extended period.23 Likewise, mere solicitation without other activities
was not doing business.24
The court in the early Virginia decisions was not reluctant to offer
definitions and tests as to what constitutes doing business. Some of these
casesns were brought by the Commonwealth for violation of what is
now Va. Code Ann. sec. 13.1-102, a statute requiring foreign corpora-
tions to obtain a certificate of authority before engaging in activity.
Substitute service was provided for in the statute. The court said,
15. Evans, Expanding Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 37 CoiREL L.Q.
458, 460 (1952).
16. HENDERSON, Op. Cit. supra note 12. Henderson chronologizes the dases which
affirmed the expansion of 'tate jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the Eighteenth
and early Nineteenth Centuries.
17. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1912).
18. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917).
19. Ibid.
20. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404, 407 (1855).
21. International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914).
22. Id. at 584.
23. Id. at 586.
24. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra note 18 at 266.
25. General Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 301, 87 S.E. 598, aff'd, 246 U.S. 500
(1915); Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 563, 88 S.E. 167 (1915);
Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 500, 122 S.E. (1924); The Western Gas
Co. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 235, 136 S.E. 646 (1927).
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[The] test to determine whether a foreign corporation transacts such
intrastate business as can be reached by State license tax is whether its
domestic business is substantial in its essence, and whether it may be
reasonably separated from its interstate commerce; and the question
does not depend upon a comparison of its intrastate with its interstate
commerce.
26
The court in Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth27 offered an extension
of this definition when it indicated that the statute was not intended to
be limited to commercial or manufacturing functions alone.
Under the Virginia Statutes the exercise of its corporate functions by
any foreign corporation within this State constitutes transacting busi-
ness here within the meaning of the Code... 2s
The conclusion in this case is suggestive of the "minimum contacts"
theory as expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washingtone9 but was
decided twenty years before the International Shoe case.
The era of tests to determine what amounted to doing business pre-
sented many elaborate formulas,30 some of which followed closely the
Virginia tests just quoted.-' But International Shoe brought an end
to the "doing business" concept and the narrow tests offered to deter-
mine it.3 2 The violation of a Washington statute3 3 requiring contribu-
26. Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 25 at 574. In this
case the court answered affirmatively the question whether demonstrating adding
machines in the state for purposes of future sales amounted to doing business.
27. Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth, supra note 25. This case involved solicitation
of membership and sale of Klan paraphernalia in the state which, for purposes of a
license tax, the Virginia Supreme Court called doing business.
28. Id. at 509.
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. See, Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. Co, 288 Pa. 240, 242, 135 A. 755, 757 (1927).
* * * The company must be present in the state . . . by an agent . . . duly
authorized to represent it in the state . . . the business transacted therein must
be by or through such agent . . . the business engaged in must be sufficient in
quantity and quality ... there must be a statute making such corporation amenable
to suit.
31. See, Eastern Livestock Co-Op. Marketing Ass'n, Inc. v. Dickenson, 107 F.2d 117
(1939); American Medical Ass'n v. U.S., 130 F.2d 233 (1942).
32. Gibson and Freeman, Business Associations, 50 U. VA. L. REv. 1265, 1273 (1964).
33. WASH. REv. STAT. § 9998-103a through 9998-123a (1941 Supp.). The specific
section applicable is 9998-114c which authorizes the Commissioner to issue an order
and notice of assessment of delinquent contributions with personal service of notice
on the employer if found in the state; if not so found, by mailing notice to the em-
ployer by registered mail at his'iast known address.
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tions to the state unemployment compensation fund was the basis for
the litigation in International Shoe. The issue was whether a foreign cor-
poration which had no registered agent in the state but which had been
soliciting sales there was subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
state court.a Without mentioning "doing business" in the opinion the
U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of the State of Washington and,
referring to the defendant's activities, said:
It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit
the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred
there.35
This opinion makes reference to reasonableness and the act having con-
nection with the state. It goes on to define "reasonable" by balancing
the inconveniences of both parties against the continuous activity of
the corporation. The inconveniences relate to the burdens of litigation
borne by both parties. Given continuous activity the court held that
it is more reasonable for a corporation to defend in the state where
it exercises the privilege of conducting activities and enjoys the bene-
fits and privileges of the laws of the state than it is for the injured party
to go to the corporation's state to sue when the evidence and the wit-
nesses are already available where the cause of action arose. The bene-
fits and privileges of the laws of the state exercised by the corporation
show the connection between the defendant's acts and the state or the
cause of action.36 This is a negation of the "presence" theory and an:
affirmance of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Historically, defenses offered in most suits brought under jurisdic-
tional statutes were founded on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and
34. The defendant had no registered agent in Washington but had a team of men
in the state soliciting sales for delivery from outside the state. The defendant admitted
that the salesmen were temporarily in Washington but contended that it was not
subject to personal jurisdiction as it was not "present" within the state. Substituted
service was made by registered mail at the last known address as per the statute and the
assessment was affirmed all the way to the Washington Supreme Court. 22 Wash.2d
146, 154 P.2d 801, 1945. Defendant was allowed a hearing before the U.S. Supreme
Court under sec. 237 (a) Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. sec. 344(a), assigning as error that
the Washington Statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause.
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 29 at 320.
36. Id. at 321.
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unconstitutional interference with interstate commerceY7 The due
process argument followed the "presence" theory but Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Harris-8 weakened this argument when it held that
a corporation by its acts could be present in a foreign state. The inter-
state commerce argument was dispelled when it was held that jurisdic-
tional statutes were within state police power.- From a reading of
International Shoe it appears that the due process argument could be
re-opened, but the Court anticipated that its liberal approach might
bring questions of unconstitutionality and offered a definitive answer
before the question could be raised.
... Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgement in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 40
The Court concluded by tying in the "reasonableness" test, the incon-
veniences of litigation, with due process.
The test is not merely, as has been sometimes suggested, whether the
activity, which the corporation has seen, is a little more or a little less.
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure.41
On the basis of International Shoe many subsequent cases have sus-
tained state jurisdiction on the basis of less activity in the state than was
previously thought sufficient. 42 The solicitation doctrine has been re-
versed 43 and a single transaction is now sufficient contact.
44
Travelers Health Association v. Commonwealth' was the solicitation
case and its decision relied heavily on International Shoe. There, a vio-
37. General Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 25.
38. 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 65 (1870).
39. International Harvester v. Kentucky, supra note 20.
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 29 at 316.
41. Id. at 319.
42. Porter, Citations and Appearance-Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations-Single
Tortious Act, 36 TuL. L. REv. 336, n.12 (1962).
43. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 57 S.E.2d 263, aff'd, 339
U.S. 643 (1949).
44. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
45. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, supra note 43.
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lation of the Virginia "Blue Sky Law" 4. resulted in an order from the
Corporation Commissioner instructing the defendaftt Association, incor-
porated in Nebraska, to cease and desist its mail order health insurance
business in Virginia. The Association had no paid agents and its new
members were obtained through the unpaid efforts of those already mem-
bers who were encouraged to recommend the defendant to friends
and submit their names to the home office in Omaha. On appeal before
the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant alleged that as its activities took
place in Nebraska, Virginia did not have power to reach it with a
cease and desist order to enforce its regulatory statute. In overruling
the defendant's due process objection, the Court referred to the obsolete
"consent" theory as follows:
But where business activities reach out beyond one state and create
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state,
courts need not resort to a fictional 'consent' in order to sustain the
jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state.47
In support of this dictum the Court relied on three earlier cases. In
Osborn v. Ozlin48 the Court had recognized a state's interest in insurance
policies protecting its residents; an interest which might give rise to re-
percussions beyond state lines. In Hoppeston Canning Co. v. Cullen4 the
Court had put emphasis on the contractual obligations in the insured's
state and the state's interest in seeing that the obligations were fulfilled.
In International Shoe'10 the Court had concluded that due process was
met when the minimum contacts giving rise to jurisdiction were sufficient
not to offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The Court used these three cases to illustrate that the defendant's con-
tacts and ties with Virginia residents, together with the state's interest,
jusified subjecting the defendant to the cease and desist order.
SECTION 8-81.2 (a) (3)-ToRTIous ACT
The single transaction case which relied heavily on International Shoe
46. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3848(47) -3848(66) (1942), now Code § 13.1-501 et seq. (1950).
§ 3848(52) of the 1942 Code was the questioned section. It authorized the commissioner
to issue a cease and desist order against further violations after notice to show cause
why such order should not issue. In case of absence from the state notice could be
served by registered mail.
47. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, supra note 43 at 647.
48. 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1939).
49. 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1942).
50. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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was Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,51 a tort action arising
in Vermont. In that case the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation,
damaged the plaintiff's house during the course of roof repairs. The in-
cident in question was the first venture for the defendant in Vermont.
The action was brought under a Vermont statute,52 similar to Va. Code
Ann. sec. 8-81.2(a) (3), which extends jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration committing a tort within the state against a state resident. The
defendant requested a dismissal on the ground of lack of due process,
contending that single or isolated acts are not sufficient to subject a
foreign corporation to jurisdiction via the medium of substitute service.
In overruling the defendant's motion, the Vermont Supreme Court
narrowed the problem to two issues: (1) Has Vermont the power to
subject by statute to the jurisdiction of its courts a foreign corporation
which commits a single tort in whole in Vermont against a resident to
actions and proceedings against it arising from and growing out of
such tort? (2) Does such a statute violate due process? 53 In deciding
the first issue in the affirmative and the second in the negative the court
acknowledged that the U. S. Supreme Court has left undecided whether
a single tortious act could subject a foreign corporation to a suit in a
state when the cause of action arose out of that activity in the state.
However, it relied on the very strong inference of single act liability
as stated in International Shoe.
... The commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate
agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the
corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority
to enforce it ... [while] . . . other such acts, because of the nature
and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed
sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit.-
From this the court concluded that the cases cited55 in International
51. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
52. VER. STAT. § 1562 (1947). This section provides that if a foreign corporation
makes a contract with a resident of Vermont, to be performed in whole or in part
there, or commits a tort in whole or in part there against a resident, such acts shall be
deemed doing business in Vermont by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed
the equivalent of appointment of the secretary of state of Vermont as its attorney
,upon whom process may be served in any actions against the foreign corporation
:arising from such contract or tort..
53. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., supra note 44 at 666.
54. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 29 at 318.
55. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926);
Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1932).
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Shoe "illustrate the proposition that continuous activity within the state
is not necessary as a prerequisite to jurisdiction." 5
The opinion concluded by recognizing a dual trend in jurisdictional
decisions. In determining the court with jurisdiction the trend is going
"from the court with immediate power over the defendant to the court
where both parties may most conveniently settle their dispute;" in de-
fining due process the trend is "from emphasis on the territorial limi-
tations of courts to emphasis on providing notice and opportunity to
be heard." 57
The single tort theory of Smyth was relied on heavily in Gray v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,"" an Illinois decision. Il-
linois has an omnibus statute'u like Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-81.2 and similar
to the Vermont statute in Smyth. One of the defendants was Titan Valve
Manufacturing Company of Cleveland, Ohio. The plaintiff was a resi-
dent of Illinois who purchased a water heater from a distributor in
Illinois. The water heater was manufactured in Pennsylvania. As a
result of a faulty safety valve manufactured by defendant Titan in Ohio,
but which was part of the heater, the heater exploded. The defendant
contended that as it had no agents in Illinois, did not sell the heater or
valve to the plaintiff and the injury complained of was defendant's only
contact with the state, maintenance of a suit against it under the Illinois
statute exceeds the limits of due process. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the defendant Ohio valve manufacturer was subject to the
jurisdiction of Illinois as per the statute.
In support of its holding the court recognized the conflict as to where
56. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., supra note 44 at 666.
57. Id. at 668.
58. 22 I1.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
59. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,. thereby submits
said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any
of said acts-'
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by personally
serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided by the
act (Section 16), with the same force and effect as though summons had been
personally served within this State.
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a tort takes place but relied on the majority decision that the place
of the wrong is the place where the last event happened to make the
actor liable. 0 It felt this was sufficient contact with the state to render
the defendant subject to its jurisdiction. It applied the minimum con-
tacts test of International Shoe, the single tortious act theory of Smyth
and the modem conveniences of communication as stated in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co."' From these cases, and the benefits de-
rived from commerce, the court concluded that
[with] the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other states. The fact
that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however,
does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business;
and it is not unreasonable where a cause of action arises from alleged
defects in his product, to say that the use of such product in the ordi-
nary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify
a requirement that he defend here.62
SEcTION 8-8 1.2 (a) (5) -BREACH OF WARRANTY
The Gray case invoked tort liability for an action which is clearly
a breach of implied warranty but no mention was made of warranties
in the decision. An action for breach of warranty is generally consid-
ered a contract action but it originally sounded in tort and may be
brought either in tort or contract. 3 The trend in warranty law seems
to be toward extending the protection of the warranty to those who
may reasonably be expected to be endangered if the object sold is defec-
tive. 4 This is in line with the trend of doing away with the privity
requirement in actions brought for breach of warranty.
The interest in consumer protection calls for warranties by the maker
that do run with the goods, to reach all who are likely to be hurt by
the use of the unfit commodity for a purpose ordinarily to be ex-
pected. 5
60. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 377 (1934).
61. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., supra note 13.
62. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 8 at 766.
63. Gile v. Kennewich Public Hospital District, 48 Wash.2d 144, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
64. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964).
65. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 28.16 (1956).
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Minnesota also has an omnibus statute,"' called the "One Act Statute,"
which provides for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if its con-
tracts with a Minnesota resident and any part of the contract is to be
performed in Minnesota, or if it commits a tort in whole or in part in
Minnesota against a resident. Like the other statutes here examined, sub-
stitute service is provided for. The Federal District Court in Eving v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.67 decided that the defendant had made war-
ranties to Northwest Airlines under the contract section of the statute
when it sold Northwest aircraft engines. Further, that those warranties
extended to Northwest's passengers, notwithstanding their state of resi-
dency, as the presence of passengers was anticipated.
SECTION 8-81.2 (a) (6)-OwNING LAND
Historically, owning property in a state does not give that state per-
sonal power over the non-resident owner.0 8 It has power only over the
property which may be the subject of an action in rem. However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained personal jurisdiction under a
statutory provision 9 similar to Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-81.2 (a) (6) in
Rumig v. Ripley Manufacturing Corp.,70 although it relied to some de-
gree on the fact that the New York defendant actively managed the
property situated in Pennsylvania."'
SECTION 8-81.2(a) (7)-CONTRACTING TO INSURE
The case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. involved a
66. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1945). Subd. 1(3) of § 303.13 is almost identical with
VER. STAT. § 1562 (1947) as discussed in note 52 supra.
67. 202 F.Supp. 216 (1962).
68. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 2.
69. Acr or 1937, P.L. 2747, 12 P.S. § 331.
From and after the passage of this act, any nonresident of the Commonwealth
being the owner, tenant, or user, of real estate located within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, and the footways and curbs adjacent thereto, or any such resident
who shall subsequently become a nonresident, shall by the ownership, possession,
occupancy, control, maintenance and use, of such real estate, footways, and curbs,
make and constitute the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his, her,
its, or their agent for the service of process in any civil action or proceeding
insituted in the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against such owner,
tenant, or user of such real estate, footways, and curbs, arising out of or by reason
of any accident or injury occurring within the Commonwealth in which such
real estate, footways, and curbs are involved.
70. 366 Pa. 393, 77 A.2d 360 (1951).
71. Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed to Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State
Defendants, 49 A.BAJ. 725, 727 (1962).
72. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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California statute73 which, like Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-81.2(a) (7), ex-
tended jurisdiction over any corporation writing an insurance policy on
a California resident or on any property in California regardless of how
the policy was obtained. Defendant had taken over a policy on the life
of a California resident from another insurance company; it had no
agents in California and communicated with policyholders only by way
of the mails. The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the California jurisdic-
tion by holding that the insurance policy was sufficient contact with the
state as per International Shoe, that California has an interest in providing
a place of redress for its residents, the defendant's benefits must give
rise to inconveniences and witnesses to the litigation would be in
California.74
CONCLUSION
The note has illustrated the efforts the courts and legislatures have
exerted in an attempt to insure the rights of residents in the light of our
everchanging economic system while still observing constitutional prin-
ciples. It is clear that improved speed and convenience of transportation
and communication have enabled corporations involved in interstate
commerce to complete in hours business transactions which would ear-
lier have required days. These improvements have created an alert-
ness in the consuming public to participate in these transactions for
their benefit and to look to the manufacturer or seller when the product
fails to meet the standards for which it was purchased. That the manu-
facturer or seller is a foreign corporation not registered to do business
in the consumer's state should not be a bar to the consumer's recovery
in that state.
However, these attempts at.protection must give rise to qu'estions of
sufficiency. Are the efforts of the courts and legislatures adequate to
achieve the goals intended or is the economy changing and the popula-
tion increasing too rapidly? Will the jurisdictional statutes provide the
needed protection to residents or will the corporate veil remain whole in
certain areas? Have the legislatures gone too far in encroaching into
areas which heretofore were constitutionally sacred?
Under statutes allowing personal jurisdiction where one is doing busi-
ness the International Shoe case has certainly liberalized the area of con-
stitutional sanctions and the bulwarks of common law defenses for the
most part no longer exist. Under the "doing business" doctrine with the
"presence" theory any connection between the act and the state was of
73. ANN. CALIF. CODE, Insurance, H 1610, 1611 (1935).
74. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., supra note 13 at 223.
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no relevance in deciding the corporation's presence within the state." If,
from the quantum of activities, regardless of their relation to the cause of
action, the corporation could not be found then it was not present for
purposes of jurisdiction.m
Clearly, the "presence" theory does not withstand the logic of the
"reasonableness" test-forum non conveniens-in making the corpora-
tion defend where it has invoked the state's benefits and privileges. This
was the reason the court offered in refusing to decide on the "presence"
issue as well as the "consent" theory; the former because it was a fiction
and the latter because it begged to be decided.7 The Travelers Health
Insurance case followed in line with International Shoe when it applied
the doctrine of forum non conveniens after receiving all the facts of
the case. Since the facts were all beneficial to the defendant the Court, in
upholding Virginia's Blue Sky Law, said: "The Due Process Clause does
not forbid a state to protect its citizens from such injustice." 78 These
holdings lead to the conclusion that statutes which permit personal juris-
diction when one is "doing business" are sufficiently broad to provide
the protection intended while remaining within constitutional bounds.
The "tortious act" statutes tend to be a repetition of the "doing busi-
ness" statutes as under them any contact will give rise to jurisdiction.
This is best illustrated by the early "tortious act" statutes, the non-resi-
dent motor vehicle acts. These acts were founded on a "consent"
theory.m By using the roads in the state the motorist "consented" to
the jurisdiction of the state by way of substitute service on a public
official. The constitutionality of these statutes has been upheld on the
theory that automobiles are dangerous instrumentalities and it is within
the state's police power to regulate the use of its highways. In-the con-
cept of International Shoe "consent" or "presence" through the use of
the highway would not be necessary to satisfy due process. The single
act of using the highway and a violation or accident in connection with
the use would be sufficient minimum contact with the state for in per-
sonam jurisdiction. In comparison with the single tort theory, it does
not appear to be any more a violation of due process to extend by statute
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for the negligent acts of its
agents in conducting the corporation's business than it does to extend
75. Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
76. Ibid.
77. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 29 at 316.
78. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, supra note 43 at 649.
79. Hess v. Pawlosl, 274 U.S. 352 (1926); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1927);
Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 SE. 644 (1939).
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jurisdiction under non-resident motorist statutes over the corporation
due to its agent's negligence in driving in a foreign state. The two acts
do not appear distinguishable for purposes of jurisdiction so long as the
substitute service is adequate. Both statutes are aimed at the protection of
residents.
Though the "tortious act" statutes are narrow they are supported
by the "doing business" statutes and therefore are adequate. Paragraphs
(3) and (4) of Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-81.2 (a) anticipate all possibilities
as paragraph (3) applies to a person causing tortious injury "in this
state" and paragraph (4) applies to torts committed "outside this state"
if accompanied with continuous activity.
Breach of warranty statutes are likewise limited but in light of mod-
em trends, as well as the cases cited, they appear to be adequate and
constitutionally sound. Privity of warranty is being abandoned80 and
strict liability in tort has been adopted in at least twenty jurisdictions
to assist residents in warranty actions.8' That a breach of warranty, based
either in contract or tort, without other activity, is sufficient contact
with the state to give rise to its jurisdiction has not been decided, but a
plaintiff's verdict in such a situation is reasonable in light of the Gray
and Ewing cases. Paragraph (5) of Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-81.2 (a) is
related to Va. Code Ann. sec. 8-654.3 which abolishes the defense
of lack of privity in actions brought for breach of warranty. Like
paragraph (4), its constitutionality is supported in that it requires some
degree of activity within the state.
Owning land as a basis for personal jurisdiction does not appear
constitutionally sound. Tide to the land as a contact with the state in
the most liberal sense seems a fiction. However, any activity with the
land such as rental, sale or building would appear to be sufficient
contact.
Contracts of insurance as a basis for jurisdiction fall within the "do-
ing business" statutes and are clearly constitutional.
There is not question that there was and is a need for jurisdictional
statutes such as the ones outlined but that they are adequate to achieve
the purposes intended only time and future litigation will decide.
Stanley G. Barr-, Jr.
80. For illustrations of historical development of warranty actions not requiring
privity see McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) and
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.S.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
81. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YAr. L.J. 1099 (1960); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50
A.B.AJ. 449 (1964).
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